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I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of equivalents was created to enlarge the scope of
actionable patent infringement by providing a method for identifying
non-literal infringement that should be prohibited and punishable by law,
and in so doing “[t]o temper unsparing logic and prevent an infringer
from stealing the benefit of the invention.”1 Under the doctrine of
equivalents, if equivalence exists between the elements of an accused
invention and the claimed elements of a patented invention, non-literal
infringement also exists.2 The enlarged scope of patent protection
provided by the doctrine of equivalents has been tailored to operate
* The author would like to thank Daniel H. Shulman and Donald W. Rupert
although he does not know them. This Note simply explores the ideas they first expressed.
The author also thanks Professor Lisa Ramsey and all the Law Review editors for their
insight and help. An obligatory, yet heartfelt, thank you to his family as well.
1. Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir.
1948).
2. Id.
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within certain restraining principles, such as the all elements rule,
prosecution history estoppel, and specification estoppel.3
After nearly a half century of application and interpretation of the
doctrine of equivalents, a new restraining doctrine emerged from the
Supreme Court’s 1997 opinion in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co.4 This new doctrine has been dubbed the claim vitiation
doctrine.5 The claim vitiation doctrine drastically limits the doctrine of
equivalents by permitting courts to decide, as a matter of law, whether or
not an alleged equivalent element of an invention vitiates a claim
limitation of a patented invention.6 If a court finds that a patent claim
must be vitiated in order to find equivalency, the alleged infringing
element cannot be an equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents, and
infringement has not occurred.7 The claim vitiation doctrine, as it is
interpreted in many Federal Circuit opinions, arguably destroys any
plausible use of the doctrine of equivalents, making any infringement

3. The all elements rule requires equivalency determination on an element-byelement basis instead of by examining the involved inventions as a whole. WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997). The prosecution
history estoppel rule provides that a patentee cannot reclaim a scope of equivalents
which he had given up, for certain reasons, during the prosecution of the patent.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733-34
(2002). Specification estoppel provides that where a “specification makes clear that the
invention does not include a particular feature, that feature is deemed to be outside the
reach of the claims of the patent, even though the language of the claims, read without
reference to the specification, might be considered broad enough to encompass the
feature in question.” SciMed Life Sys. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d
1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The specification is a written portion of the patent that
describes the invention. The specification “names all the parts or components of the
invention, describes how they work, and illustrates how they work together to perform
the invention’s function.” ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE, 112-13 (3d ed. Aspen
Publishers 2003). A patent’s claims are elements of the invention’s precise legal
definition. Id. The claims set the boundaries of the protection and rights that the patent
confers. Id. Patent claims can be viewed as limitations on what the patent protects. Id.
4. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17.
5. The authors of an article in the Federal Circuit Bar Journal coined the phrase
“claim vitiation doctrine.” See Daniel H. Shulman & Donald W. Rupert, “Vitiating” the
Doctrine of Equivalents: A New Patent Law Doctrine, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 457, 464-65
(2003).
6. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8; Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at
464-65.
7. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8; Bell Atl. Network Servs. v. Covad
Commc’ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Durel Corp. v. Osram
Sylvania, Inc., 256 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Put another way, “equivalence is
inapplicable if the significance of a limitation is lost by broadening it to afford
equivalence.” Gary Odom, Have a Seat, THE PATENT PROSPECTOR: AN OPEN FORUM OF
PATENT INFORMATION AND OPINION, http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/archives/2005/08/
have_a_seat.html (Aug. 12, 2005, 14:02 PST); Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 46465.
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less than literal infringement very difficult to prove.8 This new doctrine
has taken on several forms which are inconsistently applied throughout
the Federal Circuit, plaguing patentees, their attorneys, and the courts.9
A recent case, Freedman Seating Co. v. American Seating Co.,10
exemplifies the confusion the claim vitiation doctrine creates. By
examining Freedman within the framework of the other claim vitiation
doctrine cases it becomes apparent that changes must be made to the
existing state of the law.
The confusion and inconsistency created by the several interpretations
of the claim vitiation doctrine can be remedied by either abandoning the
doctrine or by creating one explicit version of the claim vitiation
doctrine to be predictably and evenhandedly applied.11 The simplest and
most effective solution would be express abandonment of the doctrine
by judicial ruling. The Federal Circuit or Supreme Court should trace the
doctrine back to its roots in Warner-Jenkinson and explicitly decry the
portion of that ruling that lead to the claim vitiation doctrine.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
The modern form of the doctrine of equivalents was first set forth in
1950 by the Supreme Court in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v.
Linde Air Products Co.12 The Court reasoned that limiting recovery for
patent infringement solely to literal infringement situations left open the
opportunity for an “unscrupulous copyist” to make insubstantial changes
to the patented material without being subject to the penalties for
infringement.13 The Court set forth the doctrine of equivalents to curb
the actions of such unscrupulous copyists. The doctrine of equivalents
attempted to balance protection for the patentee against the statutory

8. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 149 F.3d 1309, 1314
(Fed. Cir. 1998); Dennis Crouch, CAFC Further Vitiates Doctrine of Equivalents,
PATENTLY-O: PATENT LAW BLOG, http://www.patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2005/08/
cafc_further_vi.html (Aug. 11, 2005, 12:34 PST); see also Cooper Cameron Corp. v.
Kvaerner Oilfield Prods. Inc., 291 F.3d 1317, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Durel Corp., 256
F.3d at 1305.
9. See Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 464-65.
10. Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
11. Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 488.
12. 339 U.S. 605, 608-10 (1950). The doctrine’s actual origination occurred
almost one hundred years earlier in Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 341-42
(1853).
13. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
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requirement that patent claims state clear boundaries of the scope of the
patent granted.14
This balanced protection is achieved by examining the differences
between the claims of the patent and the corresponding elements of the
alleged infringing invention.15 If the variations between the two are so
insubstantial that the two elements could be considered equivalent, then
infringement pursuant to the doctrine of equivalents has occurred.16 The
doctrine should be invoked when an alleged infringing element
“performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way
to obtain the same result” as the patented subject matter.17 This
function-way-result examination is the traditional doctrine of equivalents
analysis by which juries make equivalency determinations.18
In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., the Supreme
Court reexamined and refined its analysis of the doctrine of equivalents.
Warner-Jenkinson and Hilton Davis both were in the manufacturing
dyes business. Hilton Davis held a patent19 for an ultra-filtration process
to remove impurities from dyes which operated within a certain pH
range.20 Hilton Davis had filed an amendment to its claims during patent
prosecution, which created a controversy when competitor WarnerJenkinson developed a similar process.21 The Court held that the
amendment which created the limitation of “at a pH from approximately
14. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33-34
(1997); Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir.
1998). A patent only provides protection for what is described in its claims. See 35
U.S.C. § 112 (2000). Section 112 also requires that a patent include (1) a written
description of the invention, (2) a description of the best mode of the invention
envisioned by the inventor, and (3) that the patent as written enable one skilled in the art
to reduce it to practice without undue experimentation. Id.
15. Multiform Desiccants, 133 F.3d at 1480.
16. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.
17. Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929) (quoting Union
Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877).
18. Derek Walter, Prosecution History Estoppel in the Post-Festo Era: The
Increased Importance of Determining What Constitutes a Relevant Narrowing Claim
Amendment, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 123, 125 (2005). In addition to the way-functionresult test, the Federal Circuit has occasionally applied a more general “insubstantial
differences” test. Id. This insubstantial differences test views patent claim elements as
being “equivalently present in an accused device if only ‘insubstantial differences’
distinguish the missing claim element from the corresponding aspects of the accused
device.” Sage Prods. v. Devon Indus., 126 F.3d 1420, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Determinations of equivalency are questions of fact to be adjudged by a jury. Bai v. L &
L Wing, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
19. The patent held was United States Patent No. 4,560,746 (the ‘746 patent).
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 21.
20. Id. at 21-22. A substance’s pH measures its acidity or alkalinity. Id. at 22 n.1.
A pH of 7.0 is that of pure water; lower numbers indicate acidity while higher numbers
indicate alkalinity. Id.
21. See id. at 22-23.
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6.0 to 9.0” did not preclude the use of the doctrine of equivalents to find
infringement by Warner-Jenkinson’s process which operated below a pH
of 6.0.22 Warner-Jenkinson’s process operated at a pH lower than the
range claimed in Hilton Davis’s patented process, and therefore did not
literally infringe.23 However, the Court could have found WarnerJenkinson’s process to be infringing under the doctrine of equivalents as
long as it held that there was equivalence between the elements of the
accused process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.24
This boiled down to the question: Was a pH lower than 6.0 equivalent to
“a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0?” If the pH lower than 6.0
performed substantially the same function in substantially the same way
to achieve the same result as the pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0, the
limitations would be considered equivalent, leading a court to conclude
infringement existed.
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Court addressed two concepts important to
the operation of the doctrine of equivalents. First, the Court held the
doctrine required equivalency on an element-by-element basis instead of
by examining the involved inventions as a whole.25 This element-by22. See id. at 32-34. The issue was actually remanded to the Federal Circuit to
determine the reason behind Hilton Davis’s amendment regarding the operational pH
level. See id. at 34. If the amendment, which narrowed the scope of the patent, was
made for reasons relating to patentability, such as to avoid the prior art, then prosecution
history estoppel would prevent Hilton Davis from claiming infringement by the doctrine
of equivalents. See id. at 33. Put another way: If Hilton Davis had to limit its claimed
pH range to obtain the patent, Hilton Davis then lost the ability to claim an equivalency
that would expand the patent’s scope to encompass the range it gave up. This illustrates
how prosecution history estoppel limits the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 33-34.
23. See id. at 23. Warner-Jenkinson’s process operated at a pH of 5.0, and Hilton
Davis conceded that there was no literal infringement. Id.
24. See Id. at 24-25. The Supreme Court did not actually make a determination on
the doctrine of equivalents issue due to the possibility of prosecution history estoppel.
See id. at 41; supra note 23 and accompanying text. The matter was remanded to the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals where it was held that, although the matter required
remand to the district court for determination of the prosecution history estoppel issue,
“sufficient record evidence to support the jury’s verdict of equivalence” existed. Hilton
Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The
Court found there was “substantial record evidence to prove that one of ordinary skill in
the art would know that performing ultrafiltration at a pH of 5.0 will allow the membrane
to perform substantially the same function in substantially the same way to reach
substantially the same result as performing ultrafiltration at 6.0.” Id. Accordingly, “[t]he
jury’s finding that the accused process with a pH of 5.0 is equivalent to the claimed
process with a lower limit of approximately 6.0 does not therefore vitiate the claim
limitation.” Id.
25. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29. “Each element contained in a patent
claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention, and thus the
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element analysis is referred to as the all elements rule.26 The all
elements rule acts as a restraint on the doctrine of equivalents.27 If
equivalency is determined based on the invention as a whole, the scope
of the invention as stated in the patent claims can be enlarged beyond its
claims.28 However, “a distinction can be drawn . . . between substitution
of an equivalent for a component in an invention and enlarging the metes
and bounds of the invention beyond what is claimed.”29 By determining
equivalency on an element-by-element basis, the courts do not enlarge a
patent beyond the scope of its claims.30
Second, the Court reaffirmed the validity of prosecution history
estoppel, which also serves as a restraint on the doctrine of equivalents.31
Prosecution history estoppel is a well-established limitation on nonliteral infringement32 that applies to amendments made to a patent
application “in order to meet objections in the Patent Office, based on
references to the prior art.”33 Estoppel applies “where the initial claims
were ‘rejected on the prior art,’ . . . and where the allegedly infringing
equivalent element was outside of the revised claims and within the prior
art that formed the basis for the rejection of the earlier claims.”34
The Court reaffirmed both of these concepts and the ways in which
they interact with the doctrine of equivalents without expressing concern
that the doctrine needed further limitation.35 The Court voiced its
satisfaction with the existing state of the doctrine of equivalents, stating
that “[s]o long as the doctrine of equivalents does not encroach beyond
doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the
invention as a whole.” Id. This element-by-element equivalency may enlarge the scope
of individual elements while not expanding the actual scope of the invention as a whole,
whereas determining equivalency at the invention level would run a greater risk of
enlarging the scope of the invention as a whole. See id. This element-by-element
determination was first implemented in the Federal Circuit in Pennwalt Corp. v. DurandWayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935-36 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
26. See, e.g., Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
27. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29.
28. See id. (citing Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512,
1573-74 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting)).
29. Id. (quoting Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1573-74).
30. See id. “The ‘scope’ is not enlarged if courts do not go beyond the substitution
of equivalent elements.” Id.
31. See id. at 30, 34. Prosecution history estoppel is the rule that a patentee cannot
reclaim a scope of equivalents which he had given up, for reasons of patentability, during
the prosecution of the patent. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733-34 (2002).
32. See id. Non-literal infringement, as opposed to literal infringement, is simply
another way of referring to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. See
Windbrella Prods. v. Taylor Made Golf Co., 414 F. Supp. 2d 305, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
33. Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136 (1942).
34. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 31 (quoting Keystone Driller Co. v. Nw. Eng’g
Corp., 294 U.S. 42, 48 n.6 (1935)).
35. See id.
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the limits just described [concerning the all elements rule], or beyond
related limits . . . , we are confident that the doctrine will not vitiate the
central functions of the patent claims themselves.”36
In addition to its thorough examination of the all elements rule and
prosecution history estoppel, Warner-Jenkinson is an influential case in
that it contains a footnote which led to the formation and resulting
permutations of the claim vitiation doctrine.37 The influential footnote
reads:
[U]nder the particular facts of a case, if prosecution history estoppel would
apply or if a theory of equivalence would entirely vitiate a particular claim
element, partial or complete judgment should be rendered by the court, as there
would be no further material issue for the jury to resolve . . . . We leave it to
the Federal Circuit how best to implement procedural improvements to promote
certainty, consistency, and reviewability to this area of the law.38

When read in context this footnote appears to be an aside commenting
on the concern that jury verdicts on infringement issues are developed in
a “black-box” and therefore the actual method by which a jury reaches
its verdict is unreviewable.39 The Court allays this concern by explaining
how a court can take the infringement issue out of the jury’s hands in
some instances.40 It simply reiterates the standard used in summary
judgment: “partial or complete judgment should be rendered by the
court, as there would be no further material issue for the jury to
resolve.”41 The court’s language does not appear to express dissatisfaction
with the manner in which the doctrine of equivalents was being applied,
36. Id. at 29-30. The “related limits” referred to are the limits imposed by
prosecution history estoppel. See id. at 30.
37. See id. at 39 n.8; Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 463-64.
38. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8.
39. See id. The Court actually prefaces this footnote by stating “[w]ith regard to
the concern over unreviewability due to black-box jury verdicts, we offer only guidance,
not specific mandate.” Id. The term “black-box” refers to the undisclosed manner by
which juries come to a verdict. See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent
Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 209, 249 (2002).
Black-box verdicts pose a problem for appellate review because the court lacks insight
into the jury’s fact-finding or reasoning. See id. The Federal Circuit deals with this
problem “by presuming that the jury found all facts in the record in support of the verdict
it chose. This evaluative process makes it much more difficult to overturn the black box
jury verdict on appeal than it is to overturn a judge verdict.” Id. This presumption may
lead courts to unknowingly sustain jury verdicts based on flawed reasoning and
misunderstanding of both factual issues and the application of the law to the facts. See id.
40. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8. The Court essentially reviews the
appropriateness of granting summary judgment. See id.
41. Id.
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nor does it seem to call for the formation of new limitations on the
existing doctrine.42 However, as a result of interpretation of this
language, a new limitation to the doctrine of equivalents was formed: the
claim vitiation doctrine.
III. THE CLAIM VITIATION DOCTRINE43
Many Federal Circuit decisions cite the language in the WarnerJenkinson footnote as the authority behind the claim vitiation doctrine.44
The claim vitiation doctrine can be generally described as a limitation on
the doctrine of equivalents decided as a question of law by a judge; the
judge determines whether a purported equivalent vitiates a claim
limitation.45 Under the claim vitiation doctrine, non-literal infringement
cannot occur as a matter of law if a finding of equivalency would vitiate
or render a claim in the pre-existing patent meaningless.46
The application of the claim vitiation doctrine has diverged into two
frequently used forms and other less frequently used forms.47 The two
frequently applied interpretations of the claim vitiation doctrine can be
referred to as the Lourie and Michel rules, named after the Federal
Circuit Judges who advocated them most prominently.48
A. The Lourie Rule
The Lourie rule treats every word in a claim as a “limitation on the
scope of the patent that must be met in an identical way.”49 This rule
represents a drastic narrowing of the scope of the doctrine of
equivalents. It has been applied to preclude any doctrine of equivalents

42. As previously mentioned, the Court stated “[s]o long as the doctrine of
equivalents does not encroach beyond the limits just described [(the all elements rule)],
or beyond related limits [(prosecution history estoppel)] . . . we are confident that the
doctrine will not vitiate the central functions of the patent claims themselves.” Id. at 2930.
43. See Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 464-65, for a much more
comprehensive analysis and explanation of all things relating to the emergence and
existence of the claim vitiation doctrine.
44. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Network Servs. v. Covad Commc’ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d
1258, 1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc. 156 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
45. A per curiam panel of the Federal Circuit wrote, “whether the application of
the doctrine of equivalents wholly vitiates a claim limitation is a question of law, which
we review de novo.” Nova Biomedical, Corp. v. I-Stat Corp., 1999 WL 693881, at *1
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 3, 1999) (unpublished opinion).
46. See Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 464-65.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 464.
49. Id. at 465.

386

PRIBISH 8-2-06.DOC

[VOL. 43: 379, 2006]

9/6/2006 2:04 PM

Freedman Seating Co.
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

infringement where structural or spatial elements have been rearranged.50
This removal of any possible equivalency for a spatial or structural
rearrangement necessarily follows from this rule because the claim of
any particular arrangement in a patent would be vitiated by any other
arrangement of the same physical elements.51
For example, in Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical
Corp. the Federal Circuit affirmed a summary judgment finding of noninfringement because a specific surgical stapler mechanism was located
on opposite ends of staplers which were otherwise the same.52 Writing
for the court, Judge Lourie said the mechanism “is located at the far end
of the [stapler], near the rear of the stapler. Because the rear of the
stapler is opposite the longitudinal slots, no reasonable jury could have
found that the USSC lockout was substantially ‘connected to said
longitudinal slots.’”53 Judge Lourie reasoned that for a specific mechanism
located on one of the devices to be equivalent to the same mechanism
located on the other end of the other device would necessarily vitiate the
part of the claim designating the position of that mechanism.54
Therefore, the court agreed that there was no genuine issue of material
fact concerning the possibility of equivalency and upheld the noninfringement verdict.55
This rationale does not sound illogical until the effect this strict
interpretation can have on the doctrine of equivalents becomes apparent.
According to the Lourie rule, an “unscrupulous copyist” may make an
50. See id. at 465-73. The Shulman & Rupert article states that the Lourie Rule
has been applied in the following cases: Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield
Prods., Inc., 291 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 256
F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2001); DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 149 F.3d
1309 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Semitool, Inc. v. Novellus Sys., Inc., 44 F. App’x 949 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (unpublished opinion); Smith Eng’g Co. v. Eisenmann Corp., 28 F. App’x 958,
967 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (applied in Judge Linn’s dissent) (unpublished opinion). Id.
51. This outcome arose in Cooper Cameron where the pre-existing patent claimed
a certain object “between the two plugs.” 291 F.3d at 1319. The alleged infringing
device had the same object positioned above the two plugs. Id. The court upheld a
summary judgment of non-infringement under the doctrine of equivalents without
actually examining whether ‘above’ and ‘between’ could be substantially equivalent.
See id. at 1322. Instead it stated that “[w]ere we to ignore Cooper’s decision to claim in
the ‘707 patent a workover port that connects to the assembly only ‘between’ the plugs,
we would vitiate that limitation and thereby run afoul of the all-limitations rule.” Id.
52. 149 F.3d 1309, 1318-19 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
53. Id. at 1319.
54. See id.
55. Id.
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insubstantial change in the positioning or arrangement of structural
elements without subjection to the penalties of infringement, even if the
new positioning or arrangement of the structural elements performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve
substantially the same result as the patented invention. This result runs
contrary to the policy behind the doctrine of equivalents.56 The factual
inquiry into the surrounding circumstances playing a part in the
traditional doctrine of equivalents analysis is entirely removed by
woodenly holding that an arrangement of structural elements different
than the arrangement claimed in a patent cannot be equivalent. This
could lead to situations in which a “fraud on the patent” can be easily
achieved by making insignificant changes in the overall invention.57
Consequently, the Lourie application of the claim vitiation doctrine
creates considerable problems for patentees and patent applicants in
drafting claims for structural or spatial limitations that provide meaningful
protection from the unscrupulous copyist. Drafting a claim for a structural
limitation that will withstand Lourie’s interpretation of the claim vitiation
doctrine necessitates intricate and confusing wording.58 Requiring this
type of drafting makes it very difficult to comply with one of the basic
tenets of patent prosecution—that claims be clear and definite.59
B. The Michel Rule
The second major interpretation of the claim vitiation doctrine, the
Michel rule, can be simply stated: “An equivalent vitiates a claim
56. The policy behind the doctrine of equivalents is the balancing of protection for
patentees from insubstantial changes to the subject matter of the patent against the public
notice requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); Warner-Jenkinson
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33-34 (1997); Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v.
Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998). That policy is part of the grander
scheme to encourage innovation set forth in the U.S. Constitution: “The Congress shall
have the power . . . to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
57. In the Graver Tank case the Court stated that “[t]he essence of the doctrine is
that one may not practice a fraud on a patent.” Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
58. The Shulman & Rupert article provides an example of this problem using the
facts from Cooper Cameron. See supra note 51 (summarizing the facts of Cooper Cameron).
[R]ather than claim a workover port between two plugs, one might claim a
workover port disposed in a functional spatial relationship relative to the two
plugs. The applicant would then be obligated to disclose in the specification
that a functional spatial relationship relative to the two plugs is preferably
between, but could also include above or below.
Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 482. This disclosure certainly is neither the easiest
nor most understandable way to word a claim for this spatial arrangement.
59. See 35 U.S.C. § 112.
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limitation if the equivalent is excluded from the literal scope of the claim
language.”60 Writing for the Federal Circuit in Athletic Alternatives, Inc.
v. Prince Manufacturing, Inc., Judge Michel explained: “As a corollary
to the ‘all limitations’ rule [i.e., the all elements rule] . . . we have held
that ‘the concept of equivalency cannot embrace a structure that is
specifically excluded from the scope of the claims.’”61 This ruling
against the possibility of equivalency was achieved without any doctrine
of equivalents analysis of whether the alleged infringing features
performed substantially the same function, in substantially the same
way, to achieve substantially the same result as the subject of the
patent.62
Applying the Michel interpretation of the claim vitiation doctrine,
practically any numerical limitation in a claim will specifically exclude
anything outside of the numerical limitation from equivalency
consideration. For example, if the Michel rule was applied to the facts
of the Warner-Jenkinson case,63 a pH of less than 6.0 could not by law
be equivalent to a pH from 6.0 to 9.0 even if the two pH levels
performed substantially the same function, in substantially the same
way, to achieve substantially the same result. This outcome provides
insight as to the Court’s intentions in Warner-Jenkinson. Had the Court
intended its ruling to result in a claim vitiation doctrine like that which
the Michel rule advocates, the Court would have ruled contrary to its
actual holding. The Court could not have intended the resultant Michel
rule and still have held as it did that a pH of less than 6.0 could be
equivalent to a pH from 6.0 to 9.0.64

60. Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 473.
61. 73 F.3d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding &
Evenflo Co., 16 F.3d 394, 400 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
62. Id. A clear example of the absurdity of strictly applying the Michel rule is
provided in Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Moore had a patent on envelopes with strips of adhesive “extending the majority of the
lengths” of the envelopes. Id. at 1095. The envelopes accused of infringement were
similar to Moore’s except they had strips of adhesive which only ran 47.8% of the length
of the envelope. Id. at 1097. The court was not persuaded by evidence that the two
envelopes were insubstantially different from one another. Id. at 1119. Instead, the
court held that the majority limitation would be vitiated by a finding that 47.8% was
equivalent to 50.1% (a majority of the length). Id. at 1106. Therefore, as a matter of
law, 47.8% of the length could not be equivalent to 50.1% of the length, and there could
be no infringement. Id.
63. See supra, Part II (discussing Warner-Jenkinson at a greater length).
64. See Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 478.
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This formulation of the doctrine creates a large burden for patentees
and patent applicants whose claims include numerical limitations or
ranges.65 In order for a patent with claims for numerical limitations or
ranges to receive meaningful protection, the claims must be drafted as
broadly as possible, which can lead to difficulty meeting the patent
prosecution requirement that claims be clear and definite.66 However, its
application is not limited to patents claiming numerical ranges. It may
effectively preclude traditional doctrine of equivalents analysis in any
infringement action where there is a literal absence of a particular
limitation regardless of the significance of that absence.67
C. Two Less Frequently Applied Forms of the
Claim Vitiation Doctrine
Two other general interpretations of the claim vitiation doctrine exist
which have not been used as frequently as the Lourie or Michel
interpretations.68 The first, referred to as the no limitation rule, applies
the claim vitiation doctrine to preclude any equivalent that requires
reading a limitation in the claims of a patent so broadly that the
limitation no longer acts as a limitation at all.69 For example, in Tronzo
v. Biomet, Inc., a claim for a device with a “generally conical outer
surface” was not equivalent to a device with a hemispherical outer
surface.70 There was no equivalence because if generally conical was
given a wide enough range of equivalents to include a hemispherical
shape, there would be no limitation at all.71 The court made this decision
even though the two shapes would function in substantially the same
way to achieve substantially the same result.72
65. Id. at 483.
66. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
67. Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 476-77. Judge Michel demonstrated this
line of reasoning in his dissent in Riles v. Shell Exploration & Production Co., 298 F.3d
1302, 1314-17 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Michel, J., dissenting). The patent at issue claimed
“metal-to-metal bearing contact” as the connecting point between two pylons. Id. at
1306. The alleged infringing product used a thin layer of wood between the two pylons.
Id. Judge Michel argued the literal absence of the “metal-to-metal” limitation precluded
any possible finding of equivalency regardless of the insignificance of the differences
between the metal-to-metal contact and the metal-to-wood contact. Id. at 1314. Judge
Michel stated, “[i]t stands to reason, then, that the claimed ‘metal-to-metal’ contact is
missing altogether from the defendant’s structure, meaning equivalent infringement as a
matter of law simply cannot occur.” Id. at 1315. The majority disagreed, finding
infringement under the doctrine of equivalency. Id. at 1309-11.
68. Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 478-79.
69. Id. at 479.
70. See Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
71. See id.
72. See id.
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The second less prevalent interpretation, the significant limitation rule,
applies the claim vitiation doctrine with varying strictness according to
the limitation’s importance.73 If the limitation in the patent is significant,
any deviations from the literal scope of the claim would vitiate the
limitation.74 The more important the claim, the less likely it will be
found to have equivalents; therefore it would receive less protection
from infringement than claims deemed less important.75 The main
problem that arises under this application of the claim vitiation doctrine
is unpredictability in both the determination of the claim’s importance
and the amount of deviation from a significant limitation that would
result in a finding of vitiation.
IV. FREEDMAN SEATING CO. V. AMERICAN SEATING CO.
Freedman Seating Co. v. American Seating Co. exemplifies how the
existence of various claim vitiation doctrine interpretations have made
non-literal infringement cases more confusing and unpredictable.
Freedman owns United States Patent No. 5,492,389 (the ‘389 patent) on
a retractable seat designed for use in public transportation.76 Freedman
sued American Seating for patent infringement based on the production
and sale of its similarly designed seat.77 The American Seating seat
did not infringe literally upon Freedman’s ‘389 patent, but the district
court held on summary judgment that the seat infringed under the
doctrine of equivalents.78 The court found that the differences between
the elements comprising the two seats were insubstantial, and therefore
the seats were equivalent79 because they performed “substantially the
same function in substantially the same manner, to achieve substantially
the same result.”80
73. Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 479.
74. Id.
75. The importance of a claim depends on how closely related the claim is to the
essence of the invention as a whole. If “deviations from the literal scope of the claim
limitation would vitiate the essence of the invention,” then doctrine of equivalents
infringement is precluded. Id. at 465.
76. Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1351-53 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
77. Id. at 1351.
78. Id. at 1355.
79. Id.
80. Id. This is the traditional function-way-result test for equivalency from
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 38 (1997) (citing
Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877)).
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The infringement dispute hinged upon whether the mechanisms used
to support the two seats and to make the seats foldable could be
considered equivalents.81 The two designs differed in the mechanism used
to fold the seats into a vertical position.82 Freedman utilized a
mechanism termed a “slider crank,”83 whereas American Seating’s
mechanism was known as a “fourth link.”84 Neither mechanism is novel
in and of itself, and both are “four bar mechanism” type designs.85
Freedman’s argument, which was accepted by the district court on
summary judgment, was based on the traditional doctrine of equivalents
analysis set forth in Graver Tank and Warner-Jenkinson.86 Freedman
asserted that the term “slidably mounted” need not be read out of the
claims to find that American Seating’s “rotatably mounted” element is
an equivalent.87 Examining the situation in light of the traditional
function-way-result test for equivalence, Freedman stated that the
functions of the two mechanisms were substantially the same, providing
support for the seat while allowing the seat to move between the
horizontal and vertical positions. The mechanisms performed these
functions in substantially the same way by providing the support bars
with movable ends; both mechanisms achieved the same result,
repositioning the support bars to allow the seats to be folded upright.88
Before the claim vitiation doctrine, this analysis would most likely not
have been challenged.89 However, the Federal Circuit, relying on a
combination of claim vitiation doctrine theories, not only challenged the
analysis, but reversed the summary judgment ruling for infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents and remanded with instructions to enter

81. Freedman Seating, 420 F.3d at 1355.
82. Id. at 1353-54.
83. The slider crank mechanism is comprised of four diagonal bars with one end
fixed to the seat’s frame at a pivot point and a movable end mounted in a vertical track.
When folding the seat up or down, the movable end slides along the track while the end
fixed to the seat simply rotates. Id. at 1352-53.
84. The fourth link mechanism does not utilize any sliding motion. Instead it
depends on three sets of rotation joints: one at the seat base, one at the wall or vertical
frame, and one somewhere between the other two along the diagonal bars connecting the
seat base and the wall or vertical frame. Id. at 1354. See infra Appendix, for diagrams
of the two designs.
85. Four bar mechanisms are common to engineering and consist of four rigid bars
with pin (rotational) joints at their ends. The relative lengths of the bars are varied to
achieve different results. D. Cheshire, Mechanism Design, http://www.staffs.ac.uk/
~entdgc/wildfiredocs/mechanisms.pdf.
86. Freedman Seating, 420 F.3d at 1355, 1357.
87. Id. at 1357.
88. Id.
89. This assertion is based on the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Freedman after examining the situation using the traditional doctrine of
equivalents analysis. Id. at 1355.
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a judgment of non-infringement for American Seating.90 The Federal
Circuit drew this conclusion by applying the claim vitiation doctrine in a
manner which can be described as a combination of the Lourie rule, the
no limitation rule, and the significant limitation rule.91 The necessity of
using this medley of legal theories and doctrines to determine whether
two devices are alike raises a warning flag about the state of the law.
The outcome of such a determination is difficult to predict, and it is
unlikely that courts could apply this legal tangle consistently. Nevertheless,
the Federal Circuit came to its conclusion that no reasonable jury could
find equivalency between the folding mechanisms of the two seats in
this manner.
The court found the basic authority for its analysis, like most decisions
based on the claim vitiation doctrine, in the Warner-Jenkinson opinion
and the all elements rule. The court stated that the all elements rule “holds
that an accused product or process is not infringing unless it contains
each limitation of the claim, either literally or by an equivalent.”92 The
court then concluded that the all elements rule requires that “an element
of an accused product or process is not, as a matter of law, equivalent to
a limitation of the claimed invention if such a finding would entirely
vitiate the limitation.”93 This was the court’s generalized restatement of
the claim vitiation doctrine.
The court then proceeded to acknowledge the confusion that surrounds
the use of the claim vitiation doctrine, stating:
There is no set formula for determining whether a finding of equivalence would
vitiate a claim limitation, and thereby violate the all limitations rule. Rather,
courts must consider the totality of the circumstances of each case and
determine whether the alleged equivalent can be fairly characterized as an
insubstantial change from the claimed subject matter without rendering the
pertinent limitation meaningless.94

90. See id. at 1364.
91. See id. at 1357-62.
92. Id. at 1358 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17, 29 (1997)).
93. Id. (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29).
94. Id. at 1359 (citing Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 375 F.3d 1328,
1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (“Permitting such an element in the accused product to come
within the bounds of the claimed element would impermissibly extend the scope of the
claim language beyond what the patentee actually claimed.”); Moore U.S.A., Inc. v.
Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ethicon Endo-Surgery,
Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 149 F.3d 1309, 1317-21 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Sage Prods., Inc. v.
Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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The court did, however, provide some insight into making this
determination based on the “totality of the circumstances” of the case.95
The court stated that circumstances including the simplicity of the
structure, the specificity of the claim, and the foreseeability of variation
at the time of the claim filing should be taken into consideration.96 It
suggested that no vitiation occurs if there is only a subtle difference in
degree provided by limitations as opposed to vitiation where there is a
“clear, substantial difference or difference in kind.”97 The court also
placed the burden of specific claim drafting squarely on the patentee: “it
is the patentee who must bear the cost of its failure to seek protection for
this foreseeable alteration of its claimed structure.”98
The court then applied these guidelines to the facts in Freedman. It
stated that a finding of equivalency would vitiate the limitation
designating Freedman’s mechanism as “slidably mounted”99 because the
movable ends of American Seating’s seat could only rotate, not slide.100
The court declared this structural difference was not a “subtle difference
in degree,” but was instead a clear, substantial difference or difference in
kind.”101 In essence, this conclusion applies the Lourie version of the
claim vitiation doctrine. Treating every word of a claim as a limitation
precludes the possibility of finding an equivalency between “slidably”
and “rotatably.”
This equivalency problem probably could have been avoided by
carefully drafting Freedman’s claim with language precluding application
of the claim vitiation doctrine. Freedman knew of other similar types of
four bar mechanisms that could foreseeably have been used in this kind
of invention.102 For example, Freedman could have claimed a support
member incorporating a four bar mechanism rotatably or slidably
mounted to the seatbase. Yet Freedman specifically chose the language
that it did.103 Freedman’s choice of claim language served the public
notice function of the patent and “[m]embers of the public were
therefore justified in relying on this specific language in assessing the
bounds of the claim.”104
The court’s analysis also incorporates features of the two less
frequently applied interpretations of the claim vitiation doctrine. In
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
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accord with the no limitations rule, the court relied on the claim vitiation
doctrine to preclude finding an equivalent which would require a
limitation to be read so broadly that the limitation no longer acts as a
limitation at all.105 Specifically, the court refused to find that the
“slidably mounted” limitation could be read so broadly as to include
“rotatably mounted” or any other known form of four bar mechanism.106
This narrow reading of the claim is based on the public’s need to rely on
the specific language used to mark the scope of the claim: “we think that
to now say the claims include other four bar mechanisms under the
doctrine of equivalents would unjustly undermine the reasonable
expectations of the public.”107
The second less frequently applied interpretation, the significant
limitation rule, may also have played an unstated part in the court’s
analysis. That view applies the claim vitiation doctrine with varying
strictness according to the importance of the limitation.108 If the
limitation in the patent is significant, any deviations from the literal
scope of the claim would vitiate the limitation. In this case the limitations
concerning the folding mechanism of the seat were the very heart of the
patent.109 Without those limitations, there would be no patent: Freedman
would just have a normal seat. According to the significant limitation
rule, because the limitations concerning the folding mechanism of
Freedman’s seat are so important to its patent, any deviation from the
literal scope of the claim vitiates the limitation.
The Federal Circuit presented a well-reasoned argument to support its
finding of non-infringement in the Freedman case. However, the broad
range of available precedent and the multiple versions of the claim
vitiation doctrine that have been expressed can arguably support a
finding of non-infringement in practically all non-literal patent

105. See id. at 1361-62. This reasoning coincides with the court’s conclusions in
Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In Tronzo, the court held
that finding a hemispherical cup equivalent to a limitation for a “generally conical outer
surface” would vitiate that limitation. Id. Broadening the scope of what “conical”
means to the point where it would include “hemispherical” renders the “conical”
limitation meaningless. Id. Therefore, “conical” and “hemispherical” cannot, as a
matter of law, be equivalents. Id.
106. Freedman Seating, 420 F.3d at 1361-62.
107. Id. at 1362.
108. Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 479.
109. See Freedman Seating, 420 F.3d at 1352-53.
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infringement disputes.110 Judges and attorneys can browse through the
case law and pick the version of the claim vitiation doctrine that best fits
their needs. The available theories are simply too broad, and without
restraint could lead to the vitiation of the doctrine of equivalents itself.
Too much confusion exists and unpredictability abounds. Patentees,
attorneys, and judges do not receive enough guidance from the existing
state of the law to pursue their respective goals with any real confidence
in the outcome. The procedural posture of Freedman highlights this
unpredictablity. The district court ruled that no reasonable jury could
find there was non-infringement and the Federal Circuit Court ruled no
reasonable jury could find there was infringement. Two such polar
opposite holdings, reached after applying what is supposed to be the
same law, are symptomatic of unclear law.
A further source of concern is that both courts decided the case on
summary judgment, yet the issue of whether the accused product
contained each claims limitation is supposedly a question of fact for a
jury to decide.111 Summary judgment is appropriate only where no
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.112
Yet in this case the district court granted a summary judgment of
non-infringement, and the Federal Circuit Court granted a summary
judgment of infringement. The level of disagreement between the courts
on a matter meant to be decided by a jury is disconcerting.
The problems arising from the various applications of the claim
vitiation doctrine raise the question of whether such a doctrine should
exist when there are already limitations in place reining in the doctrine
of equivalents where necessary. The established limitations provided by

110. Dennis Crouch, supra note 8 (stating that “[e]very defendant now has an
arguable vitiation position—since, by definition, the [Doctrine of Equivalents] is only
applied against products that do something different than what is required by the
claims”). An opinion to the contrary was also voiced: “the [Freedman] decision merely
confirms that the Doctrine cannot be used to avoid a claimed linkage between two
structural elements that would otherwise destroy its effect.” William F. Hienze,
Doctrine of Equivalents Must Not ‘Vitiate’ Limitation, I/P UPDATES, http://www.ipupdates.blogspot.com/2005/08/doctrine-of-equivalents-must-not.html (Aug. 12, 2005)
(last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
111. See RF Del., Inc. v. Pac. Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1266 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (citing Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Patent
infringement is a two part inquiry. Id. (citing Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ Per
Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1247-48 (Fed. Cir. 1998). First, as a question of law, the court
must construe the claims of the patent. Id. Second, as a question of fact, the accused
product or process must be examined to determine whether or not it contains each
limitation of the claims. Id.; see also Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
149 F.3d 1309, 1317-21 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (assessing infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents depends on the facts of each case).
112. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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prosecution history estoppel,113 specification estoppel,114 and the all
elements rule limit the doctrine of equivalents relatively easily in
comparison to the claim vitiation doctrine. The Freedman case could
have been decided using the traditional doctrine of equivalents and its
limiting constructs less confusingly and more predictably than the
analysis supplied under the claim vitiation doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
The Freedman case demonstrates the degree of confusion and
unpredictability the claim vitiation doctrine creates. It is not clear that
the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson intended to create the claim
vitiation doctrine. It is also unclear whether the doctrine is a necessary
or beneficial limitation on the doctrine of equivalents. As it now stands,
the claim vitiation doctrine causes more trouble than it is worth. The
state of the doctrine merits either abandonment or clarification to the
extent it will result in uniform application.
To clarify the law, the Federal Circuit should make an en banc ruling
in the next case on the Federal Circuit’s docket that addresses these
complicated issues involving the claim vitiation doctrine and the
doctrine of equivalents.115 If the Federal Circuit retains the claim
vitiation doctrine in some form it should not embrace either the Lourie
or Michel rules because both lack the flexibility and fact-intensive
investigation that are at the core of the doctrine of equivalents.116 Instead,
the doctrine should focus on the type of examination used in the no
limitation rule. The infringement issue should be taken away from a
jury only when an equivalent would truly vitiate a limitation in a claim
to the point that no reasonable jury could find that the alleged equivalent
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way
to achieve substantially the same result as the patented subject matter.
113. Prosecution history estoppel estops a patentee from reclaiming limitations that
were removed or narrowed during prosecution for patentability reasons. Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733-34 (2002).
114. In specification estoppel, when the specification “makes clear that the
invention does not include a particular feature, that feature is deemed to be outside the
reach of the claims of the patent, even though the language of the claims, read without
reference to the specification, might be considered broad enough to encompass the
feature in question.” SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys, Inc., 242
F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
115. Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 486.
116. Id. at 482-83.
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Had Freedman been decided using only the no limitation rule
interpretation of the claim vitiation doctrine, the outcome could have
been the same and, in any event, the analysis would have been more
clear and concise.
Compare the more sensible remedy for the problems arising from the
claim vitiation doctrine: complete abandonment. No real, compelling
argument exists that creation of the doctrine was intended in the first
place. The doctrine’s genesis in Warner-Jenkinson arguably appeared in
dicta. When read in context, the language from which the doctrine
developed simply seems to be commentary on when to apply summary
judgment in doctrine of equivalents cases. It does not appear to be an
expression of the Court’s dissatisfaction with the then-existing state of
the law, nor does it appear to call for a new doctrine decreasing the
jury’s role in equivalency factual determinations. As reflected in the
Freedom case, this less-than-solid foundation, coupled with the practical
difficulties that have arisen from multiple interpretations of the claim
vitiation doctrine, prompts the conclusion that the doctrine should no
longer be applied. To effectively extinguish the claim vitiation doctrine,
the Supreme Court should expressly disapprove it or the Federal Circuit
should reinterpret it in a different light. At the same time the Court or
Federal Circuit could reaffirm the traditional function-way-result test
for equivalency, reaffirm the doctrine of equivalents-limiting constructs
of prosecution history estoppel, specification estoppel and the all elements
rule, and reestablish the doctrine of equivalents as it existed before the
emergence of the claim vitiation doctrine.
ROBERT PRIBISH
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VI. APPENDIX

American Seating Company’s seat design with the “fourth link” mechanism. Freedman
Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Freedman Seating Company’s seat design with the slider crank mechanism. U.S.
Patent No. 5,492,389. Freedman Seating Co., 420 F.3d at 1354.
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